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ABSTRACT
The issue of religious and political identity of the Dani Muslims in Papua has 
been associated to social construction of the ethnic and religious aspects as the 
basis of political policies by the local government. The local government present 
in the form of Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua (UU OTSUS Papua) or 
the Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua has been 
understood to become one of the keys playing roles in constructing the identity of 
people in modern Papua. This work attempts to review the process of becoming 
minority of the Dani Muslims within the context of the Papua society. They live 
in the central mountains with limited infrastructure and access to modern life. 
The work suggests that the Dani Muslim has become minority in terms of polit-
ical representation as well as religious identity due to three conditions. First, the 
practice and implementation of the Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special 
Autonomy for Papua has significantly influenced the live of the Dani Muslims 
with regards to their political representation as well as religious identity. Second, 
they embrace Islam as a way of life and have to deal with the cultural conditions 
of the Dani community in general that are very consistent in maintaining their 
local tradition. Third, the domination of religious symbols used in public spaces 
has been found to have much influence to the identity of minority groups. The 
[  102  ]
AL ALBAB Volume 8 Number 1 June 2019
Christian Papuans later made further claims of Papua as the Land of Christ has 
had a broad impact not only on the access to public services for the Dani Mus-
lims but has also presented them with new pressure and marginalized in terms 
of political position and religious group existence. 
Keywords:  Muslim, politics, religious, minority, representation, identity, 
Dani, Papua
INTRODUCTION
When a Muslim indigenous child was born in Papua, at the same time he/
she becomes a minority and a third class citizen. This phenomenon has been 
understood as the result of the socio-cultural construction and applicable 
law based on ethnicity and religion. The Dani people who embrace Islam in 
the Baliem Valley of Jayawijaya represent Muslim indigenous Papuans. Dani 
Muslims comprise only 1051 people (0.45%) of a total of 233,328 inhabitants 
of Jayawijaya Regency. This minority status is legitimated by Law Number 21 
of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua. This regulation has shaped 
the community structure into social levels with Papua Christians at the top, 
Christian migrants in the second, Muslim indigenous Papuans in the third, 
and Muslim migrants in lowest (Rumbaru, 2019).
The 2010 Population Census statistics show the classification of community 
groups in Papua. The population of Jayapura City, for example, was divided 
into indigenous population with 89,773 people (34.97%) and Non-Papuans 
with 166,932 people (65.03%) from a total of 256,705 inhabitants of Jayapura 
City (Baharuddin et al., 2016). Referring to the same data, Eben Siadari, an 
Australian writer, proposed the same claim saying that indigenous Papuans in 
several major cities of Papua had become the minority. The percentage of the 
population of non-Papuans is 62.73% in Merauke, 52.46% in Nabire, 57.49% 
in Mimika, 58.68% in Keerom, and 65.09% in the city of Jayapura (Siadari, 
2017).
The literature that addresses the minority Muslim community in Papua 
focuses more on historical studies, religious participation, and education 
(Wanggai, 2007; Wekke, 2013, 2015, 2018; Murtadlo, 2018) or efforts to spread 
Islam that have caused opposition in society as a result of the involvement of 
religious followers who feel they have become the majority (Slama, 2017), with 
the aim of comparing, negating or refuting claims among religious followers. 
In contrast to this point of view, this paper seeks to look at how a Muslim 
community becomes the majority, an issue that receives little attention. The 
minority status of Papuan Muslims is not only limited to their number, but 
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also to the normative legal construction of the state which gains local political 
legitimacy for three reasons. First, the enactment of Law Number 21 of 2001 
concerning Papua’s special autonomy has placed Muslims at the bottom of the 
list of the social strata. Secondly, the claim of birth right of Papuan land in the 
name of religion has provoked the Christian groups to become the owners of 
the land. Third, the existence of the domination of religious symbols in public 
spaces represented by the Christians has contributed to the religious and 
political dynamics in the region. Those three conditions influencing the status 
of Muslim minorities in Papua will be the core discussion of this work. This 
is based on the consideration of whether the minority position has narrowed 
Muslim access to resources and public services. This unequal position has 
become a precondition for the very important discussions in the work.
MINORITY MUSLIMS IN ACADEMIC WORKS
Discussions about Muslim minority groups have been widely reviewed by 
experts from various parts of the world. Muslim minorities in Western countries 
are certainly a common topic (Aydin, 2019; Hirsch et al., 2018; Özyürek, 2018; 
Roach, 2006; Salnikova & D’Arcus, 2019; Smart-Morstad et al., 2009; Trittler, 
2018; Vanparys et al., 2013) with a focus on issues surrounding Islamophobia, 
immigrant identity, as well as several events regarding terrorism. In addition 
to Western countries, there is also works that includes the marginalization 
of Muslims minority in Congo (Leinweber, 2012), Muslim minority groups 
in Singapore (Roach, 2006), in Nepal (Dastider, 2000), and even Greece 
(Tsitselikis, 2004) where Muslims as a group have unequal access and treatment 
in various aspects. Other studies discussed Muslim minority groups in China 
(Bodde, 1946; Gladney; 1993; Gladney, 2003; Israeli, 1981) and India (Akhtar, 
2009; Amin, 2013; Engineer, 2004; Habib et al., 1976; Misra, 2000). In fact, 
Bodde (1946) mentioned that traditional Chinese people generally are not 
interested in minority groups so there is no interaction between them and 
perhaps this has also been one of the triggers of problems today.
In addition, the case of marginalization of Muslim-Rohingya in Myanmar has 
also been in the spotlight in the literature lately (Alam, 2019; Bashar, 2014; 
Gunasingham, 2019; Kipgen, 2019). In this conflict, identity is indeed needed 
for the state to be approved accordingly. For the international community, 
this identity is important to solve. There are a number of problems where 
people who want to work on their own or may want to argue in a certain way 
but must accept an identity that might be compromised so there is tension 
between groups of people or with the state (Kipgen, 2019). In fact, Muslims 
are regarded as threat because of their increasing growth in number such as 
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the case in Papua New Guinea. Scott Flower (2009; 2012a; 2012b; 2015) looked 
into the development of Muslims increase which is expected to continue in 
Papua New Guinea. Because, the transition from the traditional to the modern 
life that is taking place there, has triggered social and personal crisis which 
causes people to look for new religions that are closer to the traditional, local, 
cultural, and material dimensions (Flower, 2015).
In Papua, tensions between minority Muslim groups and local people who 
embrace Christianity has also been covered in several studies (Aritonang & 
Steenbrink, 2008; McGibbon, 2004; IPAC, 2016; Wekke, 2013; Wekke et al., 
2018). The Muslim minorities there are not always in a vulnerable position. In 
the works of Wekke, et al. (2018), the existence of sasi - a typical arrangement 
of the community for nature protection – is integrated with mosques, both 
in physical and spiritual forms, so that there is an attachment between the 
compassion of Muslims and their places of worship. After Islam arrived, this 
sasi ritual has undergone several changes, for example in the spells, time, 
and people who lead the rituals. The mosque ultimately has a role to manage 
and preserve tradition. The conflict that occurred in Papua, between Muslim 
minorities and indigenous Papuans was Tolikara, which was reported in detail 
by IPAC (2016). The majority of Muslims is also referred to by Aritonang & 
Steenbrink (2008) as immigrants. Papuans then began to indentify Indonesians 
as those with fair skin, straight hair, and practice Islam. Thus, conflicts between 
religious groups are more easily ignited.
SPECIAL AUTONOMY LAW AND MINORITY CONSTRUCT IN 
 PAPUA
Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning the Special Autonomy Law on Papua 
has in fact produced two frictions in the Papuan community, the indigenous 
and non-indigenous dichotomy, and two political representations. In fact, the 
phrase indigenous versus non-indigenous in this law is not explicitly found, 
but it is implied that the negation of the non-indigenous is obvious. In the 
consideration section of point (d) in the preamble of the Special Autonomy 
Law states that “the indigenous population in the Papua Province is one of 
the groups of the Melanesian race which is part of the nation’s ethnic groups 
in Indonesia, which has its own differences, history, customs, and language. 
Furthermore, it is emphasized by point (f) that the government has recognized 
that “the management of wealth of the Papua Province has not been used 
optimally to improve the living standards of the indigenous Papuans, which 
has created a gap between the Papua Province and other regions, as well as 
neglecting the indigenous rights of the indigenous Papuans.”
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The crystallization of the concept of indigenous Papuans has increasingly 
found its form with a specific point that explains who is native in Papua, 
as stipulated in Chapter I of the General Provisions of Article one (1) point 
(t) which states that indigenous Papuans are people of the Melanesian race 
consisting of indigenous tribes in the Papua Province and / or people who 
are accepted and recognized as being indigenous by the indigenous Papuans;” 
At the same time, in the consideration section, especially point (e) it is stated 
“that the implementation of governance and development in the Papua 
Province has not met a sense of justice, has not supported the achievement of 
people’s welfare, has not supported the development of law enforcement, and 
has not shown respect on Human Rights in the Papua Province, especially 
for the Papuan society.” The use of the word “Papuan Society” at this point 
seems to provide complete guidance about the Papuan community being fully 
left behind in various fields, both indigenous and non-indigenous people 
(as if there were no dichotomy of gap between the peoples of Papua). The 
dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous people as stated in Law 
No. 21 of 2001 in seen in table 1.
Table 1. 
Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Peoples in Papua
Indicator Criteria Legitimacy
Indigenous
1. Race Melanesia,
2. Native tribes in the Papua 
Province
3. Accepted / accepted by 
indigenous peoples
1. Special Autonomy Law of 
Papua
2. Papuan People’s assembly
3. Customary body
Non- 
Indigenous
1. Not a Melanesian race
2. Not a native tribe in 
Papua
3. Not accepted / recognized 
by indigenous peoples
1. Special Autonomy Law of 
Papua
2. Papuan People’s assembly
3. Customary body
Another perspective on the existence of minorities regarding the representation 
of politics which has resulted from the special autonomy law is the filling of the 
position of Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) members, as well as the elements 
and leadership of the MRP, where the Muslim community can only place 1 
representative out of a total of 51 members in the third period of membership 
(3), 2017-2022, which can be seen in table 2.
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Table 2 
The composition of the MRP members based on religious affiliation
Period Muslim Catholics,  Protestants Total
I    (2005-2010) 4 38 42
II   (2010-2015) 1 44 45
III  (2017-2022) 1 50 51
Total 6 132 138
Source: processed from primary data and results of interview.
CLAIMS OF PAPUAN LAND BIRTHRIGHT IN THE NAME OF 
 RELIGION
Indisputably, the claim of birthright of the land of Papua in the name of 
religion is really happening and even becoming a philosophical basis for the 
construction of a city. The statements of Ottow and Geisler, which were later 
used as a marker of Papuan Christianity as the first prayer, became the main 
foundation for the claims of Papua as the land of Gospel. They declare “in gottes 
wahen betreten wir das land” (in the name of God we set foot on this land). 
In another momentum, the affirmation of birthright of Papua in the name of 
religion gained reinforcement from the statement of I. S. Kijne, an evangelist 
whose name was enshrined as the name of one of the religious schools in the 
city of Jayapura. He declared “On this rock I establish the civilization of the 
people of Papua, even though people have high intelligence, reason and wisdom 
but cannot lead this nation. This nation will rise up and lead itself.” (I.S Kijne, 
25-10-1925)
In a contemporary perspective, the claim of birthright of land in Papua can 
be seen in the birth of several political policies that accommodate the spirit 
of religion, such as the appeal of the Mayor of Jayapura about the prohibition 
on Sunday activities in trade centers. The strict policy which was issued by 
the Regent of Jayawijaya regulates trading activities on this Sunday through 
the instruction of the Regent No. 03 of 2013 concerning the prohibition on 
trading activities on Sundays, as confirmed by the Secretary of Jayawijaya 
District, Mr Yohanis Walilo to reporters on September 4th 2017:
“We also ordered the leadership of the Civil Service Police Unit to continue 
patrolling on Sundays. The kiosks can open after four in the afternoon. 
This is part of giving lesson to the community, because many people don’t 
go to church every Sunday” 
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The statement from the Regional Secretary was reinforced by the statement 
of the Head of Jayawijaya District Civil Service Police Unit, Rustam Haji, as 
quoted in the Jubi tabloid:
“In accordance with the rules issued by the regional government regarding 
the prohibition of trading activities on Sundays, there are still many people 
who conduct trading activities before five in the afternoon, so I hope this 
(policy) can be obeyed wisely,”.
In a broader perspective, the Papua provincial secretary, Mr. Heri Dosinaen 
on August 18, 2015, also proposed a flight ban on Sundays to get to or leave 
Papua. He said “We request flight missionaries not to fly on Sundays except in 
an emergency.” In line with the discourse of the Papua Regional Secretary, 
Liputan 6 reported that 3 regencies, Tolikara, Lani Jaya and Puncak Jaya, have 
effectively imposed a ban on flights on Sundays to enter their territories. In 
addition, the use of city slogans with religious enthusiasm is a new trend, 
such as the slogan of the city of Jayapura that uses local language but with 
a religious spirit, “Hen tecahi yo onomi tmar ni hanased” which means “one 
heart (determined) to build a city for the glory of God.” 
The affirmation of the claims of Papua as a region with certain religious 
characteristics is increasingly getting its context when observing a number of 
statements from religious organizations in Papua that require the order, rules 
and characteristics of the people be based on Christian values. The Indonesian 
Priests Association along with thousands of people from the Indonesian 
Christian Communication Forums during the August 4, 2008 staged a 
demonstration at the office of the Governor of the Papua. The people demands 
include, among others, refusal to Joint Decree of 5 Ministers in Papua, rejection 
of Islamic banks, closing of all Islamic boarding schools and Islamic Centers 
in Buper Waena, and prohibition of the use of Islamic attributes in the public 
space (headscarves and the like). The demands submitted by FKKI in 2008 
were re-submitted by the Association of Jayawijaya Churches in 2016 and the 
Association of Jayapura Churches (see Image 1), taking the momentum of 
mosque constructions in Wamena and Sentani. Broadly speaking, these two 
associations of Christian religious organizations in two different districts 
voiced the same rejection even in different years with emphasis on rejection 
of the construction of mosques and prayer rooms even the desire for closure 
of existing mosques/prayer rooms, prohibition of the use of loudspeakers 
in mosques, prohibition of the use of Islamic attributes (Muslim clothing), 
and prohibition of educational facilities and public facilities with Islamic 
characteristics. 
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Image 1
Statement of the Association of Jayawijaya and Jayapura Churches 
in 2016 and 2018
DOMINATION OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC SPACES
The presence of various religious attributes and markers that were mass 
displayed in strategic public spaces has become a new agenda in various cities 
in Papua. It can be directly witnessed that each city must have deliberately 
created a special space that is not only used as a name marker for a place, but 
also exudes a strong impression that the city is dominated by the followers of 
the largest religious group. In the city of Jayapura, public spaces are filled with 
religious symbols that have become commonplace. The Crucifix Statue that 
comes with an attractive lighting architecture that emits white light at night, 
built on a small island in front of the bay of Jayapura, greets travellers visiting 
the city of Jayapura when using sea transportation. Opposite this island stands 
the Jayapura Sea port located in a narrow and steeply lined region, which is 
administratively the district of South Jayapura. The people of Jayapura city 
refer to this area as the Gadjah Putih Complex. At the top of the cliff above the 
Gadjah Putih complex, the Jayapura city government places the name of the 
city of Jayapura icon which is adjacent to the other crucifixion symbols.
At present, the Papua Provincial government is planning to build a new 
religious symbol in the city of Jayapura, marked by a giant statue of Jesus 
Christ on the coast of Base G. The Head of the Papua Provincial Public Works 
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Office, Mr. Djuli Mambaya, as quoted and reported by BBC Indonesia on the 
25th April 2017 stated:
“The 60-meter tall statue is scheduled to be ready by 2020 and part of 
the IDR 500 billion project includes building a port and access from the 
capital city of Jayapura to the peak of Mount Swajah. This statue is a 
symbol of religious diversity, a symbol of the belief of the Papuans ... at the 
western end there is the Veranda of Mecca and at the east end there is the 
Canaanite Porch or the Land of Gospel.”
Elsewhere, in the Mountain, a Giant Crucifix Monument in Wamena has just 
been completed which is named Wio Silimo, while in Merauke District, two 
giant statues of Jesus the Redeemer in Mopah Airport as high as 12 meters and 
Habe Island as high as 26 have also been erected. In general, almost every city 
in Papua will surely find religious symbols that are deliberately created and 
gain legitimacy from the local government. It is interesting to pay attention 
to the distribution of religious symbol construction, because it will display a 
unique configuration, which can be seen in the following figure 2.
Figure 2
Papua map and configuration of religious symbols
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LAW NUMBER 21 OF 2001 AND ITS IMPACT TO PAPUAN MUSLIMS
In its application, Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Papua’s special 
autonomy has succeeded in giving birth to a new jargon, “Papuans must be 
the masters of their own country” and has formed hegemony of thought and 
understanding of Papuan people in ordinary community groups, politicians, 
bureaucrats and even among religious leaders. In fact, the jargon does not 
directly make a particular ethnic group a minority or majority in terms 
of numbers, but with this term, it can be a shortcut that can create a new 
reality in understanding the dichotomy between the majority and minority in 
Papua, especially in terms of controlling resources and access to various kinds 
of public service facilities. Government programs that have been planned 
obviously legitimize the dichotomies and classes in society. Unequal rights 
between indigenous Papuans and non-indigenous people (Non-Papuans) are 
exhibited massively and supported legal means that apply in a nation state. 
The division of employment due to ethnicity is clearly stated in open spaces, 
as a response to point (f) of the preamble of Law on Special Autonomy. Non-
native Papuans are forced to accept the fact that they are of the same position 
as those who are considered to create disparities so that they are naturally 
positioned as second-class residents, who at the same time become citizens 
who receive public services lower than the indigenous Papuans, as a result of 
efforts to create justice for indigenous Papuans.
The real manifestation of this racial dichotomy is the birth of local and even 
national government policies that quantify the opportunity to obtain health 
service facilities, educational opportunities, and employment opportunities 
and representation models. Consequently, a product of the special Papuan 
health insurance policy has emerged, an opportunity to continue education in 
state universities with an allocation of 80:20 as occurred at the Cenderawasih 
University and the Institute of Public Administration. The recruitment of 
civil servants and military and police officers is also inseparable from this 
perspective, with priority being given on the basis of the racial principle, 
where indigenous people are given a very large portion while the non-Papuan 
population feel reasonable if they receive a modest portion, and again non-
indigenous Papuans are forced to accept a policy model that actually violates 
their rights as citizens that should be equal in any case. This astonishing 
inequality can also be seen in the composition of the members of the Papuan 
People’s Assembly of the third term (2017-2022). Based on religion, of the 
51 members there is only one Muslim, or in other words only 1 (%) of the 
members of the MRP is Muslim, while 99 (%) is Christian (Protestant and 
Catholic).   
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The construction of the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law for 
Papua at least indicates three aspects. First, the population dichotomy based 
on race/ethnicity is a fact and has a direct impact to the opportunity of 
citizens to obtain public services, where there are favoured and disfavoured 
parties. Second, systematically being a minority, especially in the event 
that the opportunity is forced to be accepted by non-Papuans, because it is 
a legal provision that applies specifically in that area, because in law there 
is a principle called legal fiction. Third, the legal product made by the state 
in its implementation is capable of creating a situation of being a minority 
and the lack of equality of rights between citizens, as occurred in Papua. The 
consequence of this situation is that the construction of control of resources in 
the name of race and religion is inevitable which later can be a fertile ground 
for seedlings of hatred and a growing atmosphere of disharmony between 
ethnic and interreligious relations.
PAPUA THE LAND OF CHRIST
The Papuan perspective built on Christian civilization is based on evangelical 
values by paying attention to the interaction between the zendings and 
missionaries in the trajectory of the life history of the tribes in Papua that is 
difficult to ignore. At the same time, the success of the Christians in instilling 
religious ideology as the basis for social and political movements and culture 
increasingly found its form, when the era of openness and special autonomy 
found its way in Papua. The first prayer of Ottow and Geissler on Mansinam 
Manokwari Beach and the strokes of the I.S. Kijne statement in Wondama Bay 
are authentic historical evidence of the foundation of the Papuan civilization 
in the era of enlightenment, and continue to serve as a guide until the current 
millennial era.
Reproduction of birthright based on Christian values  has recently been repeated 
not only among ordinary people, or religious organizations, but also by the 
bureaucrats in both the executive and legislative branches by basing arguments 
on the historical grounds and the special region of Papua where Christianity 
is the majority embraced by its inhabitants. Such a phenomenon is in fact 
not surprising since the feeling of being the majority gives rise to euphoria to 
egotism, and superiority. In other parts of Indonesia, the composition of the 
population of the majority religion shows the characteristics of government 
policies and religious leaders who also favour the religion that has the most 
followers. Aceh and Bali for example, can be used as the main reference to 
see the practice and expression in the name of a particular religion which is 
shrouded in a spirit of the majority (Jubba, 2019).
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In several cities in Papua, the spirit of Christianity is paving its way to be 
legitimized through several regulations issued by local governments, with the 
main assumption of respecting and giving the majority the opportunity to 
regulate their territory, which through the rule it is expected that harmony will 
be created even tend to be controlled. The appeal of the Mayor of Jayapura, 
the instructions of the District Head of Jayawijaya, or the statement of the 
Regional Secretary of the Papua Province that placed the reason for making a 
policy of prohibiting trading activities and airplane flights on Sundays to honor 
Christian worship days are examples of how religious values  are not only able 
to regulate private life, but also have a very strong contribution to organize and 
maintain public order, through majority power within government authority. 
In another perspective, policies in the name of orderliness and safeguarding 
public interests based on certain religious values  have indirectly positioned 
the community in conditions of compliance not based on legal obedience, but 
also on the spirit of obedience to the majority.
The situation complies with the majority values above, if examined further, 
begins with the conditioning of the situation through thought movements 
on the political platform and religious podiums in closed and private spaces. 
Gradually the conditioning is then carried out in public spaces, through 
demonstrative action that tends to be provocative. Rejection of mosque 
construction, Muslim dress, educational and economic products with Islamic 
label by several Christian religious groups is an indicator that there is a 
disturbing feeling of the majority religious group, in the presence of another 
religion that has the potential not only to occupy and capture the da’wah 
territory, but also changes the established atmosphere that has already existed 
and it is feared that it will seize existing resources in the fields of politics, 
economics, and even changes in life behaviour as a consequence of changing 
times (Dixon and Berger, 2007).
The description of this section finally shows the emergence of Papuan 
birthright claims as the land of Gospel (Christ) that has gone through a fairly 
long and gradual process, involving many situations, and causing endless 
debate to date. Even so, this dialectical process of religion in the land of Papua 
enables us to understand three aspects. First, the emergence of the desire of 
the majority of the people of Papua to convert the island of Papua as the land 
of Gospel was driven by historical reality and feelings as the majority group. 
Second, the urge to claim birthright of the land of Papua has been influenced 
by other realities outside of Papua that display religious practices and models 
with a feature of partiality in the name of the majority. Third, birthright claims 
to a region are considered to be an effective way to maintain the existence of 
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the majority religion from infiltration of new religions, and can minimize the 
potential for tension due to encounter of religions that have expansive traits.
DOMINATION OF THE SYMBOL OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES
The logical consequence of the existence of a religion is the presence of 
religious symbols which are not only interpreted as distinguishing identities 
between religions, they can also be interpreted as an exhibition of the 
existence and symbol of the greatness and level of civilization of a religion 
if it is placed in public spaces. In religious symbols filled with artistic values, 
there are hidden meanings which affirm greatness, virtue, excellence or even 
power which must therefore be highlighted, mass produced and placed in 
strategic positions, made as a sign and demarcation that must be obeyed and 
respected by all concerned parties, in this case other religions that have fewer 
numbers and limited access to public legitimacy. In Papua, mass production 
of religious symbols in public spaces continues to occur and gain legitimacy 
from the power of the government. The various religious symbols that have 
been erected have cost a lot and funded from the Regional Budget, such as 
the construction of a Jesus statue in Jayapura which is estimated to cost 500 
billion Rupiah. Constructions of the Statue of Jesus Christ in Merauke and 
the crucifix monument in Wamena were funded by the Regional Budget. It 
becomes difficult to argue that the emergence of a single religious symbol that 
has the full support of the regional government is a manifestation of religious 
hegemony that has received a majority of the spirit of enthusiasm which not 
only has forced power against followers of other religions who become the 
majority in one place turned out to be able to infiltrate to the stage of making 
a political policy and development in an area, even though in the process of 
making the policy it was always stated that it had been based on applicable 
rules and procedures.
It appears that the religious spirit of the majority is consciously encouraged to 
be the main argument of the importance of building religious symbols. The 
position and location of the construction of the statue of Jesus and the crucifix 
crosses from the north to the south of the island of Papua, gives a deep image 
and meaning of hegemony and religious domination enshrined in the form of 
inscriptions and monuments. The imagination of each person observing these 
symbolic positions will directly justify what religion is dominant in Papua. The 
main symbol of Christian identity in the form of monuments was built right in 
the heart of the island of Papua in Wamena, meanwhile, a gigantic Jesus Christ 
statues were built evenly in the districts and cities around the island. Finally, 
the dominance of the symbols of Christianity in Papua whose development 
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has been intensively carried out in recent years can show three things. First, 
the Christian religious symbols built in several cities are an affirmation of 
the religious identity of the majority group. Second, the majority of religious 
enthusiasm is able to create hegemony in all aspects of people’s lives, including 
the government which should protect all citizens. Third, the domination 
of the majority religion is symbolized through the existence of eternal and 
magnificent inscriptions, as well as the creation of the largest religious image 
which is strong in the region.
 
CONCLUSION
 The discussion provided in this work provides a thorough explanation 
of the various issues being faced by Muslims, especially the Dani Muslims 
in Papua. The condition of the minority Dani Muslims has placed them in 
difficult conditions and is faced with two problems at the same time. First, 
when they embrace Islam as a way of life, they also have to deal with the 
cultural conditions of the Dani community in general, who are very consistent 
in maintaining tradition. Second, when they choose Islam, it turns out that 
their condition is not much different from before. Islam, despite being the 
majority in Indonesia, is unable to free Dani Muslims from all the problems 
that surround them. Special Autonomy for Papua is one of the important 
aspects in the dynamics of the problems faced by the Dani Muslims. Special 
Autonomy provides vast opportunities for Papuans. However, this does 
not apply to the Dani Muslims. They are actually trapped in the two forms 
of situation above. They are at a crossroads between leaving tradition and 
continuing their belief as Muslims. Special Autonomy which is intended to 
exclude Papua from various problems has created a new problem for the Dani 
Muslims. Papuans who have been constructed as “Christians” have become 
a serious challenge in the midst of the efforts of the Dani Muslims to defend 
themselves. The Christian Papuans later made further claims of Papua as the 
Land of Christ. This has had a broad impact not only on the access to public 
services for the Dani Muslims, but has also presented them with new pressure. 
In fact, the Dani Muslims are considered to have left their ‘destiny’ as Papuans 
despite their physical traits.
In addition, the strengthening of religious identity in Papua has also made 
the Dani Muslims more creative in facing uncertain conditions. When the 
Islamic-Christian relation elsewhere heat up, it also affects the Papuans. 
However, the Dani Muslims do not feel the impact in their environment 
because they still have strong emotional ties with other Dani communities. 
Today, Papua has become an arena of identity contestation especially between 
Islam and Christianity. This has an impact on the relations between the Dani 
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Muslims and other Papuans. Therefore, what has been shown in this study at 
least provides a description of the various problems faced by minority groups, 
especially in Indonesia.
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